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Does local expenditure composition matter? 





The last decentralization process in Brazilian fiscal federalism was legally launched 
in 1988, when the new federal constitution passed. A considerable part of main 
public services competencies were assigned concurrently to local governments, 
which are supposed to perform these tasks relying on the financial and technical 
support from the federation. A large share of the national tax revenues was granted 
to these jurisdictions, directly or by means of transferences. The higher level of 
local revenues were not initially translated, however, into better standards of public 
services, due to a lack of coordination between states and federal government, in 
addition to technical and administrative local level deficiencies. 
Over the 1990´s the institutional framework underlying Brazilian intergovernmental 
relations experienced important changes that seek to strength vertical coordination 
between municipalities and the state/national governments. A variety of new rules 
were gradually introduced. These rules intended mainly to establish the specific 
role of each government level for each kind of public service. By 2000 a whole new 
institutional environment were built. Health care and education programs were the 
main targets of these changes and it was in these areas that institutionalization of 
intergovernmental relations went further. Grants on these areas were 
constitutionally established by constitutional amendments. And, enforcement rules 
adopted.  The aim was to guarantee better quality and access to public services. 
From one theoretical perspective these changes should improve public services by 
introducing new monitoring mechanisms. From another these changes limit local 
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government autonomy and hinder local governments capacity to develop policies 
suitable to local conditions. The arguments in favor of each position are not 
conclusive and the dilemma is long known in fiscal federalism literature.  
The question to be addressed by this paper concerns the relation between the 
centralization trend of Brazilian fiscal federalism structure as represented by the 
changes pointed above and the potential for diminishing regional disparities. The 
hypothesis to be tested is that the greater control by federation over the delivery of 
local public services may improve public services quality as a whole but does not 
necessarily favours the convergence on living conditions between regions. 
To do that it will be first presented the main changes occurred on the patterns of 
public financing and spending, which were determined by institutional changes that 
took place during the 90´s. Next it will be discussed the shifts on HDI between 
1991 and 2000. Finally, it will be established the relations between HDI and fiscal 
strucuture. 
2. Institutional  Changes 
Along the 90´s two main changes occurred on Brazilian federal fiscal structure. The 
first was on education policy with the creation of FUNDEP in 1996 a fund to 
support elementary public school and the second on health care policy with the 
introduction of a series of measures to institutionalize financing and spending in 
this area.  By 2000 many of these measures were implemented and a number of 
others were on the way. To fully understand the impact of these changes it is 
necessary to explain what they are and what their goals were.  
2.1. Education Policy - Fundef 
Fundef was created to improve the quality of elementary school in Brazil. It is a 
fund to maintain and develop the elementary school and to attribute more value to 
the teachers work. It was introduced by a constitutional amendment on September 
14, 1996 and established that 15% of the constitutional transferences from the 
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Constitutional transferences to municipios in Brazil are composed by 25% of 5 
sources: the fund of states’ participation (FPE), the fund of municipios’ participation 
(FPM), a share of the states’ value added tax (ICMS), a share of industrialized 
products tax (IPI) and the export alleviation compensation (Law n 87/96). In 
addition the federal government also transfers another amount of resources as to 
attain the minimum amount per student established annually that is called Union 
Compensation. Since 1999 the minimum amount per student is calculated based 
on a research about student costs. The Ministry of Finance based on each 
municipio tax collection calculates the necessary compensation to the municipios 
where tax collection does not guarantee the minimum amount per student. Each 
municipio transference share is estimated based on student enrollment. According 
to the Education Ministry since 1998 something like 1,5% of the Brazilian GDP has 
been spent in elementary education. It is important to stress that constitutional 
transferences are automatic and regularly attributed to municipios and states. With 
the introduction of FUNDEF part of the constitutional transferences became earn-
market although there is still some margin of discretion on spending concerning 
amounts and selection of items. The rules of FUNDEF spending are quite explicit. 
At least 60% of annual amount transferred should be utilized to pay teachers. This 
is part of the logic of increasing the value attributed to teachers by better paying 
then. The other 40% could be spent in a variety of items like building construction 
and repair, equipment buying, research on education, other activities connected to 
elementary school. The expected results were an improvement in literacy 
standards. The HDIE measures the degree of education pattern and will be used to 
ascertain the impact of the introduction of FUNDEF. 
2.2. Health Care Policy - SUS 
Health care policy went to changes deeper than education policy during the 90´s.  
The 1988 SUS (Unified Health System) was created in order to implement the 
1988 Constitution determination that health care services are universally 
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three levels of government. However, only in 1996 it was determined how the 
coordination between levels of government would be implemented. The NOB-
SUS/1996 (Unified Health System Basic Operational Norms) laid the basis for 
health policy that has been followed since then. It established that delivery of public 
health care services would mainly be municipios responsibility but that financing 
responsibility will mainly be federal. To do that it was create the National Health 
Care Fund that is the unit responsible to transfer resources to states and 
municipios. Two main kinds of transferences were established. The first 
transference aims to provide means to the delivery of basic health care and it is 
given to municipios on a per capita basis. It includes a basic assistance floor (PAB) 
and foresees increases on the floor depending on the existence and extension of 
other programs as the family health care program (PSF) or the community health 
care agents program (PACS). The second one endeavors to improve quality and 
accessibility for average and high complexity health care services. In this case 
transferences have been done on a fee-for-service base, according to the need of 
the service. This transference distribution is decided annually first by a commission 
composed of all states where the share of each state is determined and then by 
municipios commissions in each state when the share of each municipio is set. It 
was supposed that states as well as municipios should share with federal 
government the financing of public health care however until 2000 it was not 
explicit determined what should states and municipios shares be. In 2000 it was 
approved a Constitutional Amendment that render compulsory the spending of 7% 
of states and municipios revenues on health care services. 
2.3. Institutional Fiscal Structure Change and Fiscal Federalism 
The changes mentioned above are typical changes on federal fiscal relations 
between levels of government. The literature on fiscal federalism or fiscal federal 
relations
2 can offer us some hypothesis to be tested concerning the expected 
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results of these modifications. These hypotheses are not necessarily consistent 
among then. 
First it is possible to say that reducing local level autonomy could be bad to the 
delivery of public services as long as the demands of local community are better 
known by local administration. FEUNDEF is a typical case of that kind given that it 
determines that part of revenues that once were not earn market became so.  
On the other hand it can be said also with the support of the literature that the 
increase of earn-market revenues could prevent resources bad use by local level 
politicians who seek to provide services with the maximum probability of producing 
votes.  
It is important to observe that none of the above mentioned changes are perfect in 
terms of preventing local government administration from breaking contracts at 
least in part and doing what it is decided by local politicians.  Anyway supposing 
that contracts are complete it is possible to maintain both hypotheses what is quite 
conflicting. 
Another hypothesis that could be put forward is that transference revenue increase 
could be responsible for worsening public services delivery once local 
administration could always blame federal or state administration for not having 
released the resources on time or for transferring not enough resources. It is also 
usually asserted that it diminishes the incentives to get own revenue loosing 
opportunities to increase total public revenue.  
On the other hand considering countries with a huge regional income disparity like 
Brazil it is possible to say that transferences from federal or state levels to state or 
local levels are the only probable way to deliver adequate public services at local 
level.  
These last two hypotheses also point to conflicting results. To ascertain which of 
the expected results are more probable it will be relate public services delivery 
indicators to the fiscal regional structure patterns. Aguirre B., Does local expenditure composition matter? Brazilian HDI and regional living conditions 
standards  
  6
3.  HDI and Regional Disparities 
Human development indexes – HDI, are good indicators for regional differences. 
As it includes indicators for living standards as education and health along with 
income it allows observing shifts in living conditions that may not be directly related 
to income. Table 1 presents HDI for 1991 and 2000 by Brazilian regions. HDIs 
were calculated for three categories: overall, education, health and income. The 
most interesting feature that could be observed in his table is the increase in all 
HDIs for all regions between 1991 and 2000.  
 
Table 1.   
Brazilian HDI by region 
1991 and 2000 
 
North Nortest Southest South
Center-
West
HDI91 0,5768 0,5025 0,6696 0,6913 0,6512
HDI00 0,6636 0,6103 0,7449 0,7705 0,7368
HDIE91 0,6018 0,5016 0,7161 0,7559 0,6965
HDIE00 0,7552 0,6905 0,8203 0,8603 0,8220
HDIL91 0,6051 0,5553 0,6886 0,7124 0,6521
HDIL00 0,6787 0,6356 0,7543 0,7764 0,7324
HDII91 0,5235 0,4508 0,6040 0,6058 0,6049





HDI percentage changes could be seen on Graph 1. Northeast was the region that 
improved most its HDI. The biggest changes occurred in education HDI what 
suggests that FUNDEP expenditures should have contributed to this improvement. 
The smallest changes occurred in HDI income. 




Graph 1.   
HDI Changes, 1991-2000 
Table 2 depicts the HDI differences between regions by comparing each one to the 
South Region that is the one that displays the highest levels for all HDIs.  Although 
there are still huge differences in HDI values between regions it is possible to see 
that some of them have been diminishing during the period. Except for Southeast 
region all the other increased their HDIs and got near to South region and even 
nearer to Southeast region. On the other hand differences in HDI for income have 
augmented for all regions comparing to South region. It is an interesting result 
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Table 2.   
HDI Compared to South Region 
1991-2000 
These data suggest that it is advisable to test for mean differences between 
regions and also for some kind of convergence among them. Table 3 presents the 
mean differences tests results. What is possible to observe is that in 1991 regions 
Southeast (3), South (4) and Center-West (5) had HDI Income means that could be 
considered equal among them. For all the other regions/variables means were 
significantly different. In 2000 only Southeast and Center-West displayed equal 
means. This result suggests that even though HDI differences have lessened, 
regional disparities are still big and do not seem to be diminishing. 
It is quite possible that these results had been influenced by the changes is fiscal 
structure discussed above. Before relate fiscal structure to HDIs is it interesting to 
highlight some fiscal characteristics. 
  
 
North Norteast Southest South
Center-
West
HDI91 0,1146 0,1888 0,0218 0,0000 0,0402
HDI00 0,1069 0,1602 0,0256 0,0000 0,0337
HDIE91 0,1540 0,2543 0,0397 0,0000 0,0593
HDIE00 0,1051 0,1698 0,0400 0,0000 0,0382
HDIL91 0,1073 0,1571 0,0237 0,0000 0,0603
HDIL00 0,0976 0,1408 0,0221 0,0000 0,0439
HDII91 0,0823 0,1550 0,0018 0,0000 0,0008
HDII00 0,1182 0,1702 0,0149 0,0000 0,0190Aguirre B., Does local expenditure composition matter? Brazilian HDI and regional living conditions 
standards  
  9
Table 3.   











2 0,074 0,003 0,000 0,068 0,080 2 0,053 0,003 0,000 0,048 0,058
3 -0,093 0,003 0,000 -0,099 -0,087 3 -0,081 0,003 0,000 -0,087 -0,076
4 -0,115 0,003 0,000 -0,121 -0,108 4 -0,107 0,003 0,000 -0,112 -0,102
5 -0,074 0,004 0,000 -0,082 -0,067 5 -0,073 0,003 0,000 -0,080 -0,067
1 -0,074 0,003 0,000 -0,080 -0,068 1 -0,053 0,003 0,000 -0,058 -0,048
3 -0,167 0,002 0,000 -0,171 -0,163 3 -0,135 0,002 0,000 -0,138 -0,131
4 -0,189 0,002 0,000 -0,193 -0,184 4 -0,160 0,002 0,000 -0,164 -0,157
5 -0,149 0,003 0,000 -0,155 -0,142 5 -0,127 0,003 0,000 -0,132 -0,121
1 0,093 0,003 0,000 0,087 0,099 1 0,081 0,003 0,000 0,076 0,087
2 0,167 0,002 0,000 0,163 0,171 2 0,135 0,002 0,000 0,131 0,138
4 -0,022 0,002 0,000 -0,026 -0,017 4 -0,026 0,002 0,000 -0,029 -0,022
5 0,018 0,003 0,000 0,012 0,025 5 0,008 0,003 0,002 0,003 0,013
1 0,115 0,003 0,000 0,108 0,121 1 0,107 0,003 0,000 0,102 0,112
2 0,189 0,002 0,000 0,184 0,193 2 0,160 0,002 0,000 0,157 0,164
3 0,022 0,002 0,000 0,017 0,026 3 0,026 0,002 0,000 0,022 0,029
5 0,040 0,003 0,000 0,034 0,047 5 0,034 0,003 0,000 0,028 0,039
1 0,074 0,004 0,000 0,067 0,082 1 0,073 0,003 0,000 0,067 0,080
2 0,149 0,003 0,000 0,142 0,155 2 0,127 0,003 0,000 0,121 0,132
3 -0,018 0,003 0,000 -0,025 -0,012 3 -0,008 0,003 0,002 -0,013 -0,003
4 -0,040 0,003 0,000 -0,047 -0,034 4 -0,034 0,003 0,000 -0,039 -0,028
2 0,100 0,005 0,000 0,091 0,109 2 0,065 0,003 0,000 0,058 0,071
3 -0,114 0,005 0,000 -0,124 -0,105 3 -0,065 0,003 0,000 -0,071 -0,059
4 -0,154 0,005 0,000 -0,164 -0,144 4 -0,105 0,003 0,000 -0,112 -0,099
5 -0,095 0,006 0,000 -0,106 -0,083 5 -0,067 0,004 0,000 -0,075 -0,059
1 -0,100 0,005 0,000 -0,109 -0,091 1 -0,065 0,003 0,000 -0,071 -0,058
3 -0,215 0,003 0,000 -0,220 -0,209 3 -0,130 0,002 0,000 -0,134 -0,126
4 -0,254 0,003 0,000 -0,261 -0,248 4 -0,170 0,002 0,000 -0,174 -0,165
5 -0,195 0,005 0,000 -0,204 -0,186 5 -0,132 0,003 0,000 -0,138 -0,125
1 0,114 0,005 0,000 0,105 0,124 1 0,065 0,003 0,000 0,059 0,071
2 0,215 0,003 0,000 0,209 0,220 2 0,130 0,002 0,000 0,126 0,134
4 -0,040 0,003 0,000 -0,046 -0,033 4 -0,040 0,002 0,000 -0,044 -0,035
5 0,020 0,005 0,000 0,010 0,029 5 -0,002 0,003 0,591 -0,008 0,005
1 0,154 0,005 0,000 0,144 0,164 1 0,105 0,003 0,000 0,099 0,112
2 0,254 0,003 0,000 0,248 0,261 2 0,170 0,002 0,000 0,165 0,174
3 0,040 0,003 0,000 0,033 0,046 3 0,040 0,002 0,000 0,035 0,044
5 0,059 0,005 0,000 0,050 0,069 5 0,038 0,003 0,000 0,032 0,045
1 0,095 0,006 0,000 0,083 0,106 1 0,067 0,004 0,000 0,059 0,075
2 0,195 0,005 0,000 0,186 0,204 2 0,132 0,003 0,000 0,125 0,138
3 -0,020 0,005 0,000 -0,029 -0,010 3 0,002 0,003 0,591 -0,005 0,008
4 -0,059 0,005 0,000 -0,069 -0,050 4 -0,038 0,003 0,000 -0,045 -0,032
2 0,050 0,003 0,000 0,044 0,056 2 0,043 0,003 0,000 0,037 0,049
3 -0,084 0,003 0,000 -0,090 -0,078 3 -0,076 0,003 0,000 -0,081 -0,070
4 -0,107 0,003 0,000 -0,114 -0,101 4 -0,098 0,003 0,000 -0,104 -0,092
5 -0,047 0,004 0,000 -0,054 -0,040 5 -0,054 0,004 0,000 -0,061 -0,046
1 -0,050 0,003 0,000 -0,056 -0,044 1 -0,043 0,003 0,000 -0,049 -0,037
3 -0,133 0,002 0,000 -0,137 -0,130 3 -0,119 0,002 0,000 -0,122 -0,115
4 -0,157 0,002 0,000 -0,161 -0,153 4 -0,141 0,002 0,000 -0,145 -0,137
5 -0,097 0,003 0,000 -0,103 -0,091 5 -0,097 0,003 0,000 -0,103 -0,091
1 0,084 0,003 0,000 0,078 0,090 1 0,076 0,003 0,000 0,070 0,081
2 0,133 0,002 0,000 0,130 0,137 2 0,119 0,002 0,000 0,115 0,122
4 -0,024 0,002 0,000 -0,028 -0,019 4 -0,022 0,002 0,000 -0,026 -0,018
5 0,037 0,003 0,000 0,031 0,043 5 0,022 0,003 0,000 0,016 0,028
1 0,107 0,003 0,000 0,101 0,114 1 0,098 0,003 0,000 0,092 0,104
2 0,157 0,002 0,000 0,153 0,161 2 0,141 0,002 0,000 0,137 0,145
3 0,024 0,002 0,000 0,019 0,028 3 0,022 0,002 0,000 0,018 0,026
5 0,060 0,003 0,000 0,054 0,067 5 0,044 0,003 0,000 0,038 0,050
1 0,047 0,004 0,000 0,040 0,054 1 0,054 0,004 0,000 0,046 0,061
2 0,097 0,003 0,000 0,091 0,103 2 0,097 0,003 0,000 0,091 0,103
3 -0,037 0,003 0,000 -0,043 -0,031 3 -0,022 0,003 0,000 -0,028 -0,016
4 -0,060 0,003 0,000 -0,067 -0,054 4 -0,044 0,003 0,000 -0,050 -0,038
2 0,073 0,004 0,000 0,066 0,080 2 0,052 0,003 0,000 0,046 0,058
3 -0,081 0,004 0,000 -0,087 -0,074 3 -0,103 0,003 0,000 -0,110 -0,097
4 -0,082 0,004 0,000 -0,090 -0,075 4 -0,118 0,003 0,000 -0,125 -0,111
5 -0,081 0,004 0,000 -0,090 -0,073 5 -0,099 0,004 0,000 -0,107 -0,091
1 -0,073 0,004 0,000 -0,080 -0,066 1 -0,052 0,003 0,000 -0,058 -0,046
3 -0,153 0,002 0,000 -0,158 -0,149 3 -0,155 0,002 0,000 -0,159 -0,151
4 -0,155 0,003 0,000 -0,160 -0,150 4 -0,170 0,002 0,000 -0,175 -0,166
5 -0,154 0,004 0,000 -0,161 -0,147 5 -0,151 0,003 0,000 -0,158 -0,145
1 0,081 0,004 0,000 0,074 0,087 1 0,103 0,003 0,000 0,097 0,110
2 0,153 0,002 0,000 0,149 0,158 2 0,155 0,002 0,000 0,151 0,159
4 -0,002 0,003 0,489 -0,007 0,003 4 -0,015 0,002 0,000 -0,019 -0,010
5 -0,001 0,004 0,793 -0,008 0,006 5 0,004 0,003 0,207 -0,002 0,011
1 0,082 0,004 0,000 0,075 0,090 1 0,118 0,003 0,000 0,111 0,125
2 0,155 0,003 0,000 0,150 0,160 2 0,170 0,002 0,000 0,166 0,175
3 0,002 0,003 0,489 -0,003 0,007 3 0,015 0,002 0,000 0,010 0,019
5 0,001 0,004 0,823 -0,006 0,008 5 0,019 0,003 0,000 0,012 0,026
1 0,081 0,004 0,000 0,073 0,090 1 0,099 0,004 0,000 0,091 0,107
2 0,154 0,004 0,000 0,147 0,161 2 0,151 0,003 0,000 0,145 0,158
3 0,001 0,004 0,793 -0,006 0,008 3 -0,004 0,003 0,207 -0,011 0,002
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4.  Regional Patterns of Public Revenues and Expenditures 
There are a few features on Brazilian fiscal structure that are worth mentioned for 
this paper purposes. Contrary to what happens in the majority of federations in the 
world Brazilian Constitution considers municipios as federal entities in the same 
level as the Union and the states. This means that municipios are politically as 
autonomous as states and Union. Even though constitution attributes this status to 
municipios in reality they are not as autonomous as it could suggest. Taken into 
account the whole country only 4.4% in 1990 and 5.1% of local budget revenues 
were taxes revenues. On the other hand transferences corresponded to 75.6% in 
1990 and 84.5% in 1999. Municipios received federal and state transferences. The 
most important transference is FPM that corresponded to 45.5% in 1990 and 
40.8% in 1999 of total budget revenues. The FPM share lost from 1990 to 1999 
should be related to the new transferences mentioned on item 2. The dependency 
from states is not negligible. States transferences to municipios were 17.1% of total 
budget revenues in 1990 and 28.4% in 1999. 
Regional patterns of public revenues are not all too uniform considering the 
extremely similar role that the Constitution assign to each level of government. The 
main reason that explains regional differences in public budget composition is 
probably income level. However it is possible to observe some patterns that could 
not be accounted for solely by income. Graph 2 displays the regional revenues 
structure. Although transferences are extremely important in all regions they 
respond for a higher share of budget revenues their regional pattern changed a 
little between 1990 and 1999. In 1990 South and Center-West regions 
transferences were the biggest share of their budget among regions.  In 1999, their 
position changed and North and Northeast regions were the ones to exhibit the 
greatest transferences share of budget revenues. The Northeast, South and 
Center-West regions transferences increases were mainly due to state 
transferences. It suggests that transferences trends are in accordance to 
decreasing regional disparities policy. It is also possible to observe that tax Aguirre B., Does local expenditure composition matter? Brazilian HDI and regional living conditions 
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revenues increased a little in Southeast region.  So it is easy to see that some 
important changes occurred. All regions are now relying more on transferences but 
some are more than others. For 1990 it is not available all the revenues items that 
exists for 1999. However is important to take a look on the items that appear in 
1999. 
 
Graph 2.    
 
Graph 3 shows the shares of the most important earn-market transferences from 
union and states to municipios. As is possible to perceive states transferences to 
local levels are much more important in South and Southeast regions than in North 
and Northeast regions.  This graph also suggests that union transferences are 
playing the role of diminish regional disparities. At the same time states on the 
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good public services delivery sharing a significant amount of their revenues with 
local levels specially to provide education.  
 
Graph 3.   
Expenses structure also changed during this period. Unfortunately there is no 
available data about spending by function. The only information it is possible to 
obtain is spending by kind. Graph 4 depicts this information. Along the period 
considered current expenses grew in comparison to capital expenses. It may 
indicate that indebtness diminished. Personal expenses also increased in all 
regions. The increase in labor expenses could be attributable to the increase in 
education and health car services what is consistent with the creation of FUNDEF 
and SUS. On the other hand investment expenses decreased considerably. 
Regional patterns show some differences. In North and Southeast regions current 
expenses grew much faster than in other regions. This growth is mainly explained 
by personal expenses increase. Another important difference was the larger 
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increase in transferences expenses in Southeast, South and Center-West regions. 
This should be attributed to SUS transferences between local levels. 
Graph 4.   
So far there has been pointed that fiscal structure and HDIs trends have showed 
patterns that could not be explained only by income shifts. So it seems that there is 
room to try to explain some of the HDI shifts by fiscal structure arrangements. 
5.  Fiscal Structure and HDI 
First of all it is interesting to check the existent relationship between the three HID. 
Table 4 depicts the correlations beteween those variables. All the correlation are 
higth and significant as it would be expected. However It is of note the fact that 
correlations between health and education HDIs are closer than the ones relating 
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Table 4.   
 
Two main decisions emerge from this fact. The first is that income HDI should be 
an important variable to explain the other two HDIs and second that other variables 
like the ones that compose fiscal structure should be capable to explain some of 
the health and education HDIs variation. 
To explore the causalities that could exist between HDIs and fiscal variables it was 
estimated four linear regressions for each of the HDIs considered. Table 5 
presents the results for education HDI and Table 6 for health HDI. The models use 
three kinds of variables: dummies for regions, income HDI (to control for wealth) 
and the fiscal variables. All the fiscal variables considered are from the year before 
HDIs were estimated supposing that the HDIs results for one year should mainly 
be explained by last year’s patterns of fiscal structure. Another important remark to 
be done is that 2000 was local level year’s election. So 2000 HDIs should reflect 
last mandates patterns of public budgets.  
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Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). **. 
























tS i g .
Model B Std. Error Beta Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 0,222 0,011 20,428 0,000 (Constant) 0,364 0,010 35,115 0,000
DNO -0,039 0,004 -0,068 -8,657 0,000 DNO 0,003 0,003 0,008 1,112 0,266
DNE -0,085 0,003 -0,302 -25,598 0,000 DNE -0,021 0,002 -0,106 -9,582 0,000
DSU 0,033 0,003 0,099 12,248 0,000 DSU 0,031 0,002 0,155 19,470 0,000
DCO -0,018 0,004 -0,038 -4,917 0,000 DCO 0,008 0,002 0,024 3,316 0,001
IDHR91 0,824 0,017 0,593 48,952 0,000 IDHR00 0,675 0,012 0,725 57,621 0,000
RECTRB0 0,044 0,017 0,023 2,574 0,010 RECTRB9 0,056 0,014 0,043 4,004 0,000
RETRACO0 -0,004 0,007 -0,005 -0,591 0,555 RETRACO9 0,007 0,007 0,010 0,978 0,328
R Square 0,786 R Square 0,797
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tS i g .
Unstandardized CoefficientsStandardized Coet
Sig.
Model B Std. Error Beta Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 0,232 0,012 19,593 0,000 (Constant) 0,413 0,011 38,219 0,000
DNO -0,038 0,005 -0,067 -8,319 0,000 DNO 0,001 0,003 0,002 0,224 0,823
DNE -0,086 0,003 -0,307 -25,728 0,000 DNE -0,021 0,002 -0,106 -9,067 0,000
DSU 0,040 0,004 0,122 9,858 0,000 DSU 0,032 0,002 0,163 20,667 0,000
DCO -0,015 0,004 -0,032 -4,172 0,000 DCO 0,005 0,002 0,015 1,988 0,047
IDHR91 0,802 0,019 0,577 42,262 0,000 IDHR00 0,601 0,014 0,645 43,669 0,000
IPTU0 0,086 0,046 0,014 1,852 0,064 IPTU9 0,052 0,024 0,020 2,170 0,030
ISS0 0,148 0,039 0,030 3,790 0,000 ISS9 0,180 0,026 0,055 6,884 0,000
FPM0 -0,004 0,007 -0,006 -0,543 0,587 FPM9 0,004 0,007 0,007 0,545 0,586
COTICMS0 0,007 0,009 0,008 0,711 0,477 COTICMS9 0,049 0,009 0,062 5,308 0,000
OUTRES0 -0,056 0,015 -0,036 -3,792 0,000 OUTRES9 -0,004 0,021 -0,001 -0,197 0,844
OUTRCOR0 -0,002 0,008 -0,003 -0,256 0,798 OUTRCOR9 -0,018 0,016 -0,009 -1,142 0,254
R Square 0,788 FUNDEF9 -0,101 0,013 -0,076 -8,091 0,000
SUS9 0,067 0,015 0,034 4,335 0,000
OUTRUN9 0,016 0,013 0,010 1,175 0,240
COIPVA9 -0,033 0,046 -0,006 -0,723 0,469
FUNDEST9 -0,099 0,013 -0,065 -7,749 0,000
SUSES9 0,036 0,049 0,005 0,750 0,453








The first model employs only the two most aggregated levels of current revenues: 
taxes and transferences. The idea of first introducing only these two variables was 
to ascertain if they would be significant in explaining HDI variation by themselves 
or not. Taxes revenues for 1990 and 1999 (RECTRB0 and RECTRB9) are 
significant and have the expected positive sign. It indicates that the effort to collect 
seems to have positive effects on the delivery of public education services as HDI 
increases with higher budget shares of taxes revenues. It is also interesting to 
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hdil91tritradr
Dependent Variable: IDHL91 Coefficients





tS i g .
Unstandardized CoefficientsStandardized C t
Sig.
Model B Std. Error Beta Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 0,43 0,009 50,452 0,000 (Constant) 0,403 0,012 33,047 0,00
DNO -0,05 0,004 -0,128 -13,349 0,000 DNO -0,030 0,004 -0,087 -8,681 0,00
DNE -0,07 0,003 -0,381 -26,312 0,000 DNE -0,035 0,003 -0,201 -13,760 0,00
DSU 0,02 0,002 0,081 8,220 0,000 DSU 0,012 0,002 0,067 6,422 0,00
DCO -0,04 0,003 -0,124 -13,177 0,000 DCO -0,021 0,003 -0,072 -7,429 0,00
IDHR91 0,44 0,013 0,494 33,263 0,000 IDHR00 0,550 0,014 0,662 39,927 0,00
RECTRB0 -0,05 0,013 -0,043 -3,970 0,000 RECTRB9 -0,117 0,017 -0,099 -7,031 0,00















tS i g .
Model B Std. Error Beta Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 0,45 0,009 48,991 0,000 (Constant) 0,41 0,01 31,65 0,00
DNO -0,05 0,004 -0,132 -13,725 0,000 DNO -0,02 0,00 -0,07 -6,69 0,00
DNE -0,07 0,003 -0,386 -26,939 0,000 DNE -0,03 0,00 -0,15 -9,55 0,00
DSU 0,02 0,003 0,088 5,898 0,000 DSU 0,01 0,00 0,07 6,23 0,00
DCO -0,04 0,003 -0,126 -13,666 0,000 DCO -0,02 0,00 -0,07 -7,10 0,00
IDHR91 0,41 0,015 0,460 28,022 0,000 IDHR00 0,53 0,02 0,64 32,17 0,00
IPTU0 -0,11 0,036 -0,028 -2,966 0,003 IPTU9 -0,09 0,03 -0,04 -3,12 0,00
ISS0 -0,10 0,030 -0,033 -3,470 0,001 ISS9 -0,15 0,03 -0,05 -4,88 0,00
FPM0 -0,02 0,005 -0,041 -3,007 0,003 FPM9 0,02 0,01 0,04 2,40 0,02
COTICMS0 0,01 0,007 0,010 0,698 0,485 COTICMS9 0,01 0,01 0,02 1,34 0,18
OUTRES0 -0,10 0,011 -0,100 -8,849 0,000 OUTRES9 -0,03 0,02 -0,01 -1,19 0,23
OUTRCOR0 0,02 0,007 0,049 3,025 0,003 OUTRCOR9 -0,02 0,02 -0,01 -1,10 0,27
R Square 0,69 FUNDEF9 -0,10 0,01 -0,09 -6,75 0,00
SUS9 -0,03 0,02 -0,02 -1,78 0,08
OUTRUN9 -0,05 0,02 -0,03 -2,87 0,00
COIPVA9 0,04 0,05 0,01 0,71 0,48
FUNDEST9 -0,04 0,02 -0,03 -2,32 0,02
SUSES9 0,00 0,06 0,00 0,06 0,95
R Square 0,66Aguirre B., Does local expenditure composition matter? Brazilian HDI and regional living conditions 
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observe that in 1999 the influence of taxes revenue on HDI education were 
stronger than in 1990 signifying that the above mentioned effect should have 
acquired a larger influence on HDI education. On the other hand transferences 
from federal and state levels to local level (RETRACO0 and RETRACO9) were not 
significant and also 1990 transferences had a negative sign. As expect the proxy 
for municipio affluence HDIR was highly significant and its coefficient was the most 
powerful one. However the fact that taxes revenues entered the regression 
significantly implies that income is not the sole variable to explain education HDI 
variation. The dummies for regions also were all significant and showed the right 
signs.  
To explore a little further the information it was estimated the second model for 
education HDI where fiscal variables were disaggregated. Both transferences and 
taxes now assume their original source. For 1990 we have two taxes sources: 
property (IPTU0) and services (ISS0), and four transferences items: federal local 
participation fund (FPM0), participation on state vat tax (COTICMS0), other state 
transferences (OUTRES0) and current transferences from other sources 
(OUTRCOR0). In 1999 we have the new transferences that were created to 
implement the decentralization process. So for this year there is other four new 
items that stand for: the federal education fund (FUNDEF9), the federal health fund 
(SUS9), the state education fund (FUNDEST9) and the state health fund 
(SUSES9). In addition for this year there other two items witch where in existence 
in 1990 but did not appear on the budget for that year: other federal transferences 
(OUTRUN9) and the local participation on state vehicle property tax (COIPVA9). 
Again for both years the single most important variable was income HDI. Following 
we have the regional dummies with their correct signs. In 1990 three out of four 
fiscal variables were significant. They were: property tax (IPTU0) services taxes 
(ISS0) and other state transferences (OUTRES0). Both local level taxes have 
positive signs confirming the result of the first regression. The other significant 
variable had a negative signal implying that it does not have a favorable impact on Aguirre B., Does local expenditure composition matter? Brazilian HDI and regional living conditions 
standards  
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education HDI. The other three transferences were not significant and with the 
exception of participation on state vat tax (COTICMS0) they exhibited negative 
signs.  
In 1999 the picture changed a little. Only two of three variables witch were 
significant in 1990 maintained the same result with the same signal (IPTU0 and 
ISS0). They are taxes variables. The transference that were significant in 1990 
(OUTRES0) is not any more in 1999 but the sign was maintained. Of the three that 
were non significant in 1990 two continue to be (FPM9 and OUTRCOR9) while 
COTICMS0 became significant and favorable to education HDI improvement. 
Among the variables that exist only for 1999 there are three non-significant and 
other three significant. The significant ones were: FUNDEF9, FUNDEST9 and 
SUS9. The first two are to be the specific purpose transferences for education and 
it is astonishing that they are significant but with a negative sign indicating that 
increases in these funds shares caused decrease in education HDI. As it was 
pointed before at least 60% of these funds are to be spent on teachers´ wages. It is 
possible to imagine that the teachers that are being hired could not be the best 
people to take the job. On April 11, 2004 one of the most influent Brazilian 
newspaper “O Estado de São Paulo” publish that Federal Public Ministry3 
estimates that only 25% of FUNDEF was correctly utilized. The news brought 
evidence of prefeitos´4 relatives being hired, of firms specialized on faking sales to 
municipios and so on. Brazilian newspapers have been publishing a lot of material 
about these occurrences. 34 prefeitos have been arrested following these 
investigations so far. Considering the size of the corruption that could exist in the 
use of these funds the results obtained could be not so astonishing. Actually what 
the regressions may be showing is that these kind transferences when their use 
                                            
3 Public Ministry is the public unit responsible to investigate denounces about public misconduct. 
4 Prefeitos are the local executive chiefs. Aguirre B., Does local expenditure composition matter? Brazilian HDI and regional living conditions 
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could not be properly monitored may most probably be damaging for the purpose 
they were created.  
Also SUS9 was significant but in this case the sign is positive. This is wear too 
because this transference is the one intended to improve health care services and 
not education. Lastly the remaining three transference variables (SUSES9, 
OUTRUN9 and COIPVA9) were not significant. It is worthwhile mentioned that the 
regression for education HDI 2000 exhibited a higher R square than the one for 
1991. 
Turning our attention to health HDI it is possible to observe that the results for 
these variables are not as consistent as for education HDI. Again in all the models 
the regional dummies and income HDI continue to be significant and to present the 
correct sign. In the first model were only transferences revenues were not 
significant in both years. Taxes revenues were significant however the sign was 
contrary to expected.  
When the disaggregate variables are considered again it is possible to observe the 
same strange pattern. In 1991 the variables that explained health HDI were: 
IPTU0, ISS0, OUTRES0 and OUTRCOR0. Only one variable COTICMS0 was not 
significant. Among the significant ones only one OUTRCOR0 was favorable to 
increases in health HDI. In this case like in the former model taxes revenues did 
not favor health HDI amelioration. Contrary to the result for education HDI 
strengthening efforts to collect taxes at local level do not have a positive impact on 
health HDI.  
When we look at the results for 2000 health HDI the picture does not turn clearer. 
The same results obtained for 1991 stand for four variables: IPTU9, ISS9, FPM9 
and COTICMS9. OUTRES9 and OUTRCOR9 turn to be not significant. In respect 
to those variables that did not existed on 1990 budget we had four significant and 
two non significant. All the significant ones have negative signs indicating that 
these transferences have a negative impact on health HDI. It is strange to observe Aguirre B., Does local expenditure composition matter? Brazilian HDI and regional living conditions 
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that among those four we find SUS9 that is the transference specific to health care 
services. 
In the case of health HDI it is not possible to conclude that the fiscal variables 
could have any positive impact.  
6. Concluding  remarks 
Brazilian federalism went to significant changes along the 90´s. Some of these 
changes were intended to improve public services especially education and health 
for what there have been created specific funds as described on a previous 
section. On the other hand Brazilian HDI along the 90´s exhibited significant 
changes like meaningful increases and also diminishing differences between 
regions.  
Some hypotheses were putted forward in this paper concerning the relationship 
between changes in federalism rules and shifts on HDI. The first one was that the 
changes should improve public services by introducing new monitoring 
mechanisms. In fact the changes provided local administrations with resources that 
otherwise would not be available. The share of transferences increased along the 
90´s however these increases did not proved to be favorable to increases in HDIs. 
The estimated regressions results disclosed generally negative relations between 
transferences and HDIs. One of the reasons for these results could be that the 
monitoring mechanisms introduced were not as effective as they should be and did 
not actually offer the enforcement for right resources use.  
This could indicate that these transferences being earn market limit local 
government autonomy and hinder local governments capacity to develop policies 
suitable to local conditions. This hypothesis acquires strength if it is associated to 
the result that taxes transferences were generally significant to explain education 
HDI and showed the expected signs. However there could be another hypothesis 
to be considered. It may be that accountability in respect to taxes raised at local 
level is greater than for transferences. Considering education HDI this hypothesis Aguirre B., Does local expenditure composition matter? Brazilian HDI and regional living conditions 
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finds some support in both years once the coefficients for taxes variables were 
significant and depicts the right signs. However for health HDIs the same results 
did not hold. 
Considering the results obtained it is not possible to affirm that changes in federal 
transferences have the potential to diminishing regional disparities. The main 
hypothesis suggested in this paper was that the greater control by federation over 
the delivery of local public services may improve public services quality as a whole 
but does not necessarily favors the convergence on living conditions between 
regions. According to our results not even this hypothesis holds. The decrease in 
HDIs regional disparities should be looked after somewhere else and we need a 
better understanding of the reasons why changes fiscal structure could not 
respond to population needs. 
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